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Abstract This paper shows that the scheme described in Haber and Stornetta
[Haber and Stornetta Jr., 1994] for extending the validity of a crypto-
graphic timestamp for a Time Stamping Service contains security short-
comings. A modification is proposed to rectify the identified shortcom-
ings.
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1. Introduction
A time-stamping service (TSS) has been identified by both the IETF
and ISO/IEC as a potentially important part of a Public Key Infras-
tructure (PKI), and draft standards have been produced by both bodies
[Adams et al., 2001, ISO/IEC, 2001]. Conventionally, and as originally
proposed by Haber and Stornetta in 1991 [Haber and Stornetta, 1991], a
TSS will take as input a hash-code of a data string supplied by a client,
and will return a digital signature computed on a concatenation of this
hash-code and a time-stamp (the cryptographic timestamp). This cryp-
tographic timestamp can then be used as evidence that the original data
string existed at the time indicated, without revealing the data string to
the TSS. The hash-code should be computed using a collision-resistant
one-way hash-function (see for example [Menezes et al., 1997]).
One particularly important application of a TSS is to prolong the
lifetime of a digital signature. Without use of a TSS, when a public
key certificate expires or is revoked, all signatures computed using the
corresponding private key potentially lose their validity. This is because,
if the private key becomes known, it is possible to forge signed documents
that are indistinguishable from documents produced prior to the point
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2at which the private key was compromised. On the other hand, if a TSS
adds a signed timestamp to a signed document, then this proves that the
signature on the document was created prior to the time at which the
timestamp was created. Even if the signing key is subsequently revoked,
the fact that the original signature can be shown to have been created
prior to the time of revocation means that the signature remains valid.
Of course, in some environments, and depending on the policy in force,
signatures may not lose their validity if the public key revocation occurs
for reasons other than key compromise. However, even in such cases,
problems may eventually arise because key lengths deemed secure at the
time the signature was created may no longer be deemed secure at some
later date.
This is particularly relevant for circumstances where signatures are
needed to have long-term validity. One obvious example where this
will be the case is for the signing of high-value financial transactions
and/or contracts, where, as with handwritten signatures, digital signa-
tures will be expected to last indefinitely. It is therefore very likely that
timestamping services will be of particular importance for PKIs used to
support security for financial applications. This issue is also discussed
in RFC 3161, [Adams et al., 2001, Appendix B].
If the signature key of the TSS itself is about to expire, then it is typ-
ically necessary to re-timestamp the original cryptographic timestamp
with a new TSS signature key, if the original timestamp is to remain
valid. This issue has been widely discussed in the literature (see for ex-
ample [Bayer et al., 1993]). However, independently of the security of
the digital signature created by the TSS, the strength of a cryptographic
timestamp also relies on the security of the hash function used to com-
pute the hash-code submitted to the TSS [Preneel et al., 1998]. This
paper focuses on ways of dealing with the situation where this hash-
function is broken, since such an event has the potential to invalidate all
cryptographic timestamps computed with this hash-function.
Other authors discuss witnessing and linking techniques in order to
improve the security and accountability of the TSS scheme [Buldas et al.,
2000]. However, if a pre-image of the hash-code is discovered at any stage
after the cryptographic timestamp is produced, the additional techniques
will not provide proof of prior existence for the document. Increases
in computing power and new algorithmic techniques mean that cur-
rent “trusted” hash-functions are likely to eventually need replacement.
Hence, as soon as any doubts about future use of a particular hash-
function arise, and before it is known to be broken, the cryptographic
timestamp should be renewed.
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Note that loss of confidence in the hash-function is not the only reason
for renewal of a cryptographic timestamp. Indeed, timestamp renewal
is more commonly discussed in the context of update of the TSS key
pair. However, for the purposes of this paper, renewal of cryptographic
timestamps refers only to updating the hash-function.
2. The Haber-Stornetta renewal protocol
Haber and Stornetta considered the hash-function renewal problem
very briefly in their original 1991 paper [Haber and Stornetta, 1991], and
Bayer et al. proposed some modifications in [Bayer et al., 1993]. A much
more concrete proposal appeared in the Haber and Stronetta patent
[Haber and Stornetta Jr., 1994], and it is this latter scheme we consider
here. We first describe their basic time-stamping protocol, and then
go on to outline their proposed solution to dealing with hash-functions
that require renewal. Note that the form of the timestamping protocol
included in the latest draft standards [Adams et al., 2001, ISO/IEC,
2001] is very similar to the Haber and Stornetta proposal.
The basic timestamping protocol, as described in [Haber and Stor-
netta Jr., 1994], has two steps. First the client requests a timestamp
from the TSS, as follows:
A→TSS: h(M‖X) = h(R),
where A denotes the client of the TSS, M is the ‘message’ to be
timestamped, ‖ denotes concatenation of data items, X is other
data of unspecified form as chosen by the client, and h is a hash-
function. The concatenation of M and X is also written as R (for
receipt). Note that the Haber and Stornetta patent [Haber and
Stornetta Jr., 1994] is not completely clear as to the purpose of
the data string X — they simply suggest that it is used to identify
M by, for example, including the ‘author data’.
Second, the TSS responds with the cryptographic timestamp C:
TSS→A: C = STSS(h(R)‖T ),
where STSS denotes the digital signature function of the TSS, and
T is the time/date stamp.
On receipt of C, the client A stores it as evidence that M existed at
time T .
Note that in their patent specification, [Haber and Stornetta Jr., 1994]
Haber and Stornetta actually propose the use of a cryptographic times-
tamp function F , which is used to compute C, i.e. C = F (R). We have
chosen the simplest interpretation of F , namely that F involves con-
catenation with a timestamp and applying the TSS’s digital signature
4function. In fact, F could also involve the concatenation of data in addi-
tion to the timestamp, to support more complex variants of the scheme.
However, this is outside the scope of this paper.
The protocol for renewing the cryptographic timestamp to extend its
lifetime is as follows:
A→TSS: h′(C‖M),
where h′ denotes the replacement hash-function.
The TSS responds by sending the extended cryptographic timestamp
back to the client;
TSS→A: C ′ = S′TSS(h′(C‖M)‖T ′),
where C ′ is the extended cryptographic timestamp, T ′ is the time
of the renewal request and S′TSS is the new signature function of
the TSS.
It is also stated in [Haber and Stornetta Jr., 1994] that an alternative
more secure way of obtaining a cryptographic timestamp involves use of
a compound cryptographic timestamp. Compound cryptographic times-
tamps are essentially the same as the previous cryptographic timestamps
but use two different trusted hash functions, which are applied in par-
allel to the same receipt. To initiate the basic protocol the client sends
h(R)‖h′(R) and consequently two signatures are produced by the TSS.
This potentially increases the lifetime of the cryptographic timestamp
before a renewal is required.
3. Attack and Observation
We now describe a possible attack against the Haber and Stornetta
hash-function renewal protocol. In the attack we suppose that the hash-
function used in the original timestamping protocol has been compro-
mised at some point after the renewal process, i.e. the very situation
which renewal is supposed to deal with.
The attack is initiated after the first basic cryptographic timestamp
is issued and is completed at a later time. In this attack there is no need
to break h′ and we only assume that the initial hash h is compromised.
The attack is performed as follows:
1 Get C: Using the basic protocol, the attacker obtains the cryp-
tographic timestamp C = STSS(h(R)‖T ). Note that we assume
R = (M‖X) for some X.
2 Obtain C ′: The attacker at time T ′ wants to backdate a forged
message M ′ to T . He does this by requesting a renewal for the
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original cryptographic timestamp C by sending h′(C‖M ′) to the
TSS, thus obtaining C ′ = S′TSS(h
′(C‖M ′)‖T ′). Now at time T ′,
both hash-functions h and h′ remain secure, and therefore at this
stage C ′ cannot be used as the basis of an attack on the scheme.
3 Break h: At a later time T ′′, suppose h has been broken, so that
it is no longer a one-way function. That is, we assume that pre-
images can be found for h. Suppose that, as a result, the attacker
is able to find a pre-image for h(R) under h, i.e. the attacker can
find a string R? such that h(R?) = h(R). Suppose, moreover,
that the attacker can choose the first part of the pre-image R?
— in particular we suppose that the attacker chooses R? so that
R? = M ′‖X? for some string X?. We are thus supposing that
h has been subject to a particularly severe form of failure, i.e. so
that we can find pre-images for which the first part can be freely
chosen. Note however that, given that h involves the iterative use
of a round-function (as is the case for all commonly used hash-
functions), such a catastrophic failure of the one-way property is
not unlikely if the round-function is found to be weak.
The attacker can now claim that the message M ′ was signed at time T ,
with C as proof and renewed cryptographic timestamp C ′ as supporting
evidence. Before proceeding, observe that, during the attack described
above, in order to find the string R? such that h(R?) = h(R), where
R? = M ′‖X? for some string X?, some part of X? will need to be
effectively ‘random’. It might consequently be argued that this will
reveal the attack, since the third party adjudicating in a dispute will
observe that X? is a meaningless sequence.
However, whilst this may be true in some circumstances, there is a
danger that the situation will not always be so clear cut. First, it might
be possible to choose the first part of X? to conform to what is expected
of such strings, and then to arrange for the random part to be disguised
(e.g. as random padding of some kind). Second, the patent specification
merely states that the string X can be chosen by the client, and hence
it is not reasonable to expect a third party adjudicator to decide what
was in the client’s mind when he created the string X. Third, it is not
good practice to design protocols which rely on third parties making
judgements about whether a string is meaningful or not. The protocol
should be designed to avoid such issues, and we show below how this
can be achieved in a very simple way.
It should be clear that the main reason that this attack is possible
is that the original timestamp involves signing h(R), where R = M‖X,
and the timestamp renewal involves signing h′(C‖M). That is the two
6timestamps actually involve different data strings, namely M‖X in the
first case, and M in the second case. It is this difference that allows the
attack to take place. This observation motivates the proposed protocol
modifications discussed in the next section.
4. Revised versions of the protocol
Based on the above observation on the cause of the attack, we propose
that the protocol should be modified in the following minimal way.
To obtain a basic cryptographic timestamp, the client initiates the
request and the TSS responds, as follows:
A→TSS: h(Y ),
where Y denotes either M or R =M‖X. Whichever version of Y
is adopted, it must be preserved exactly in the renewal protocol.
TSS→A: C = STSS(h(Y )‖T ).
The protocol for renewing the cryptographic timestamp in order to ex-
tend its lifetime is as follows:
A→TSS: h′(C‖Y ),
TSS→A: C ′ = S′TSS(h′(C‖Y )‖T ′).
The only change is to fix the fundamental problem which led to the
previous attack, namely that the two timestamps involve different bit-
string inputs into the hash-function. Note that, in the case Y =M , this
modification has previously been described in various places, including
in [Haber and Stornetta, 1997]. However, it is important to note that
the reason to adopt this variant (or the variant with Y = M‖X) in
favour of the protocol described in [Haber and Stornetta Jr., 1994], i.e.
the existence of the attack described above, has never previously been
discussed.
We now consider certain other possible modifications to both the ba-
sic and the renewal protocols. First note that we are essentially using
h(Y ) in the basic protocol and h′(h(Y )‖Y ) for the renewal request. An
equally secure alternative would be to use h(Y ) and h(Y )‖h′(Y ) in the
respective steps. However, there is no added value in this alternative. In
fact the scheme will require the TSS to differentiate between new times-
tamps and renewal ones. This will unnecessarily complicate the practical
implementation of the TSS, in addition to using more bandwidth.
A second modification is to include a hash-function identifier with
the hash-code [ISO/IEC, 2001]. This is of fundamental importance in
ensuring that the hash-code can not be deliberately mis-represented as
having been generated using a different (weaker) hash-function.
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A third modification is the inclusion of the message length with the
hash-code [PKITS, 1998]. This limits the freedom of an attacker at-
tempting to find a second pre-image for the hash-code.
With these latter two modifications, the basic timestamping protocol
is now as follows:
A→TSS: h(Y )‖N‖hID,
where hID is a one byte hash-identifier and N is the length of Y .
TSS→A: C = STSS(h(Y )‖N‖hID‖T ),
The corresponding modified protocol for renewing a cryptographic times-
tamp to extend its lifetime is as follows:
A→TSS: h′(C‖Y )‖N‖hID′,
where hID′ denotes the hash identifier of h′.
TSS→A: C ′ = S′TSS(h′(C‖Y )‖N‖hID′‖T ′).
5. Conclusion
It has been shown that, in the case where the original hash-function
admits pre-image attacks, the Haber and Stornetta cryptographic times-
tamp renewal scheme [Haber and Stornetta Jr., 1994] does not prevent
retrospective forgeries. However, this renewal scheme was designed to
prevent forgeries in precisely these circumstances. A modification to the
protocol that prevents these attacks has been proposed. The modified
protocol has a computational and communications overhead that is very
similar to the original scheme.
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